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Rationality, Reliability, and Natural Selection

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 April 2022

Richard Feldman
Richard Feldman*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, University of Rochester
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Abstract

A tempting argument for human rationality goes like this: it is more conducive to survival to have true beliefs than false beliefs, so it is more conducive to survival to use reliable belief-forming strategies than unreliable ones. But reliable strategies are rational strategies, so there is a selective advantage to using rational strategies. Since we have evolved, we must use rational strategies. In this paper I argue that some criticisms of this argument offered by Stephen Stich fail because they rely on unsubstantiated interpretations of some results from experimental psychology. I raise two objections to the argument: (i) even if it is advantageous to use rational strategies, it does not follow that we actually use them; and (ii) natural selection need not favor only or even primarily reliable belief-forming strategies.

Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 55 , Issue 2 , June 1988 , pp. 218 - 227
Copyright
Copyright © 1988 by the Philosophy of Science Association

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Footnotes

†

A version of this paper was read at the 1985 meeting of the Central Division of the APA. Robert Richardson gave helpful comments. I would like to thank Earl Conee, Peter Markie, Mark Stone, and Ed Wierenga for their comments on drafts of the paper.

References

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