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Reductionism and the Unification Theory of Explanation

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 April 2022

Todd Jones
Todd Jones*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy University of Nevada at Las Vegas
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Abstract

P. Kitcher's unification theory of explanation appears to endorse a reductionistic view of scientific explanation that is inconsistant with scientific practice. In this paper, I argue that this appearance is illusory. The existence of multiply realizable generalizations enable the unification theory to also count many high-level accounts as explanatory.

Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 62 , Issue 1 , March 1995 , pp. 21 - 30
Copyright
Copyright © Philosophy of Science Association 1995

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Footnotes

†

I would like to thank Philip Kitcher, Maurice Finocchiaro, and an anonymous referee for many helpful comments they made on earlier drafts of this paper.

‡

Send reprint requests to the author, Department of Philosophy, University of Nevada at Las Vegas, 4505 Maryland Parkway, Las Vegas, NV 89154-5028, USA.

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