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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 14 March 2022
For the purposes of this paper, realism is defined as the belief that in visual perception there is a direct perception of material bodies existing in space external to the perceiver's body. Most contemporary positivists and analytical philosophers are realists in this sense. Included in this classification would be all those who argue from the character of seen relations of bodies to the uniformity view of causation; those who oppose public (extended or in space) to private experience; those who believe that one can point to facts; those who believe in the real existence of objects like extended solid tables and chairs; and those who distinguish in terms of verifiability between judgments of color and judgments of value.
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2 S. Z. Hasan: Realism. Cambridge, At the University Press, 1928, p. 46.
3 G. E. Moore: “Refutation of Idealism.” Philosophical Studies, p. 12.
4 Op. Cit., p. 195-6.
5 A. O. Lovejoy: The Revolt Against Dualism. Open Court, 1930, p. 44.
6 H. H. Price: Perception. London, Methuen & Co., 1932, p. 2.
7 Op. Cit., p. 36.
8 Op. Cit., p. 67.
9 B. Russell: “The Limits of Empiricism” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, N. S., Vol. 36, 1935-36, pp. 131-150.
10 G. W. Leibniz: New Essays Concerning Human Understanding. New York, The Macmillan Co., 1896, pp. 111, 130.
11 G. E. Moore: “The Status of Sense-data.” Philosophical Studies, p. 183-4.
12 W. P. Montague: “The Story of American Realism.” Philosophy, Vol. XII, No. 46, April, 1937, p. 145.
13 Op. Cit., p. 68.