Hostname: page-component-cd9895bd7-hc48f Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-12-26T04:00:59.208Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

Renormalizing Epistemology

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 April 2022

Jarrett Leplin
Jarrett Leplin*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy University of North Carolina, Greensboro
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

The fact that the goals and methods of science, as well as its empirical conclusions, are subject to change, is shown to allow at once for: (a) the objectivity of warrant for knowledge claims; (b) the absence of a priori standards from epistemology; (c) the normative character of epistemology; and (d) the rationality of axiological innovation. In particular, Laudan's attempt to make axiological constraints undercut epistemic realism is confuted.

Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 57 , Issue 1 , March 1990 , pp. 20 - 33
Copyright
Copyright © 1990 by the Philosophy of Science Association

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

REFERENCES

Doppelt, G. (1990), “The Naturalist Conception of Methodological Standards in Science: A Critique”, Philosophy of Science 57: 1–19.10.1086/289527CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Laudan, L. (1974), Progress and Its Problems. Berkeley: University of California Press.Google Scholar
Laudan, L. (1984), Science and Values. Berkeley: University of California Press.Google Scholar
Laudan, L. (1987a), “Progress or Rationality? The Prospects for Normative Naturalism”, American Philosophical Quarterly 24: 19–31.Google Scholar
Laudan, L. (1987b), “Relativism, Naturalism, and Reticulation”, Synthese 71: 221–234.10.1007/BF00485630CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Leplin, J. (1986), “Methodological Realism and Scientific Rationality”, Philosophy of Science 53: 31–51.10.1086/289290CrossRefGoogle Scholar