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A Response to Jackson

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 March 2022

F. John Clendinnen
F. John Clendinnen*
Affiliation:
University of Melbourne
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Extract

Frank Jackson's criticisms have helped me recognize some of the weaknesses in my proposed vindication of induction. The core of the argument I offered was that induction is the only method of predicting which is based in a nonarbitrary way on the facts. I still believe that this is so and that because of this property induction is the only reasonable way of predicting. However I now recognize defects in the argument by which I attempted to establish that the uniqueness of this property to induction constitutes its justification.

Type
Discussion
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 37 , Issue 3 , September 1970 , pp. 444 - 448
Copyright
Copyright © 1970 by The Philosophy of Science Association

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References

REFERENCES

[1] Clendinnen, F. J., “Induction and Objectivity,” Philosophy of Science, vol. 33, No. 3, 1966, pp. 215–229.10.1086/288095CrossRefGoogle Scholar
[2] Jackson, F., “A Reply to ‘Induction and Objectivity‘”, Philosophy of Science, this issue.Google Scholar