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Review of Stuart Glennan, The New Mechanical Philosophy
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 01 January 2022
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- Copyright © The Philosophy of Science Association
Footnotes
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I am very grateful to Stuart Glennan for his reading and constructive comments and to Michelle Pham for her insightful suggestions and careful editing of this essay.
References
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