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Robert Stalnaker, Inquiry

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 April 2022

Hartry Field
Hartry Field*
Affiliation:
School of Philosophy, University of Southern California
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Extract

This is an interesting, well argued, and highly readable book; anyone interested in the central philosophical problems with which it deals will benefit from studying it.

Stalnaker defines inquiry as the process of forming, testing, and revising beliefs. His goal is to lay the groundwork for a theory of inquiry, by elaborating and defending a certain apparatus in terms of which the process of inquiry should be described.

Type
Critical Notice
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 53 , Issue 3 , September 1986 , pp. 425 - 448
Copyright
Copyright © The Philosophy of Science Association 1986

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