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Robustness in Signaling Games

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2022

Simon M. Huttegger
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Abstract

The spontaneous emergence of signaling has already been studied in terms of standard evolutionary dynamics of signaling games. Standard evolutionary dynamics is given by the replicator equations. Thus, it is not clear whether the results for standard evolutionary dynamics depend crucially on the functional form of the replicator equations. In this paper I show that the basic results for the replicator dynamics of signaling games carry over to a number of other evolutionary dynamics.

Type
Evolutionary Models and Evolutionary Psychology
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 74 , Issue 5: Proceedings of the 2006 Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association. Part I: Contributed Papers. Edited by Cristina Bicchieri and Jason Alexander , December 2007 , pp. 839 - 847
Copyright
Copyright © The Philosophy of Science Association

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Footnotes

‡

This research was supported by the Konrad Lorenz Institute for Evolution and Cognition Research.

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