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The Scientist as Child

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 April 2022

Alison Gopnik
Alison Gopnik*
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology, University of California, Berkeley
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Abstract

This paper argues that there are powerful similarities between cognitive development in children and scientific theory change. These similarities are best explained by postulating an underlying abstract set of rules and representations that underwrite both types of cognitive abilities. In fact, science may be successful largely because it exploits powerful and flexible cognitive devices that were designed by evolution to facilitate learning in young children. Both science and cognitive development involve abstract, coherent systems of entities and rules, theories. In both cases, theories provide predictions, explanations, and interpretations. In both, theories change in characteristic ways in response to counterevidence. These ideas are illustrated by an account of children's developing understanding of the mind.

Information

Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 63 , Issue 4 , December 1996 , pp. 485 - 514
Copyright
Copyright © Philosophy of Science Association 1996

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Footnotes

†

The research and ideas reported in this paper were supported by NSF grant DBS9213959. A portion of it was presented at the Society for Philosophy and Psychology, June, 1995. I am grateful to Henry Wellman, Andrew Meltzoff, Clark Glymour, John Campbell, Philip Kitcher, Eric Schwitzgebel, and two reviewers for illuminating discussions and comments.

‡

Send reprint requests to the author, Department of Psychology, University of California, Berkeley, CA 94720.

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