Published online by Cambridge University Press: 01 April 2022
The epistemological status of semantic components of ethnosemantics is investigated with reference to Wittgenstein's definition of the meaning of a word as its use in language. Semantic components, like the intension of words in logistic philosophy, constitute the conditions which must pertain to objects in order that they are denoted by particular words. “Componential meaning” is determined to be another form of “unitary meaning” and hence subject to the same critical arguments made by Wittgenstein against the latter's three fundamental types: (1) meanings are objects, (2) meanings are images, and (3) meanings are feelings and mental experiences. A rebuttal to D'Andrade's labeling rule objection to the usage theory of meaning is presented.
I would like to thank Harold W. Burris, Jr., J. L. Fischer, James W. Springer, and Stanley R. Witkowski for reading and commenting upon earlier drafts of this paper. I am also grateful for the many good suggestions for change offered by Philosophy of Science referees.