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Signals, Evolution and the Explanatory Power of Transient Information

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2022

Brian Skyrms
Brian Skyrms*
Affiliation:
University of California, Irvine
*
Send requests for reprints to the author, Department in Logic and Philosophy of Science, School of Social Sciences, University of California, Irvine, CA 92697-5100; bskyrms@uci.edu.
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Abstract

Pre-play signals that cost nothing are sometimes thought to be of no significance in interactions which are not games of pure common interest. We investigate the effect of pre-play signals in an evolutionary setting for Assurance, or Stag Hunt, games and for a Bargaining game. The evolutionary game with signals is found to have dramatically different dynamics from the same game without signals. Signals change stability properties of equilibria in the base game, create new polymorphic equilibria, and change the basins of attraction of equilibria in the base game. Signals carry information at equilibrium in the case of the new polymorphic equilibria, but transient information is the basis for large changes in the magnitude of basins of attraction of equilibria in the base game. These phenomena exemplify new and important differences between evolutionary game theory and game theory based on rational choice.

Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 69 , Issue 3 , September 2002 , pp. 407 - 428
Copyright
Copyright © The Philosophy of Science Association

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