Hostname: page-component-7dd5485656-2pp2p Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2025-10-31T22:27:21.231Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

Solutions to the Paradoxes of Confirmation, Goodman's Paradox, and Two New Theories of Confirmation

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 April 2022

Lin Chao-Tien
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Extract

1. Confirmation Theory One, which we shall construct, when applied to the Raven Hypothesis yields the following results:

  1. (1.1) Any black raven confirms the Raven Hypothesis.

  2. (1.2) Any black non-raven confirms the Raven Hypothesis.

  3. (2) Any non-black raven disconfirms the Raven Hypothesis.

  4. (3) Any non-black non-raven is neutral to the Raven Hypothesis.

Theory One consists of two parts: (A) six basic concepts from confirmation theory proper, and (B) the underlying logic.

Information

Type
Discussion
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 45 , Issue 3 , September 1978 , pp. 415 - 419
Copyright
Copyright © Philosophy of Science Association 1978

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Article purchase

Temporarily unavailable

Footnotes

†

The author would like to thank his referees for their comments on an earlier version of this paper.

References

[1] Hempel, C. G. “Studies in the Logic of Confirmation,” In Aspects of Scientific Explanation. New York: The Free Press, 1965. pp. 3–51.Google Scholar
[2] Leblanc, H. “That Positive Instances Are No Help.” Journal of Philosophy LX (1963): 453–462.10.2307/2022874CrossRefGoogle Scholar
[3] Wajsberg, M. “Axiomatization of the Three-Valued Propositional Logic.” In S. McCall (ed.), Polish Logic: 1920–1939. Oxford: 1967. pp. 264–284.Google Scholar