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Species, Higher Taxa, and the Units of Evolution

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 April 2022

Marc Ereshefsky
Marc Ereshefsky*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, Washington University
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Abstract

A number of authors argue that while species are evolutionary units, individuals and real entities, higher taxa are not. I argue that drawing the divide between species and higher taxa along such lines has not been successful. Common conceptions of evolutionary units either include or exclude both types of taxa. Most species, like all higher taxa, are not individuals, but historical entities. Furthermore, higher taxa are neither more nor less real than species. None of this implies that there is no distinction between species and higher taxa; the point is that such a distinction is more subtle than many authors have claimed.

Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 58 , Issue 1 , March 1991 , pp. 84 - 101
Copyright
Copyright © 1991 The Philosophy of Science Association

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Footnotes

†

The author thanks David Hull, John Kirsch, Ernst Mayr, Elliott Sober and an anonymous referee of this journal for their comments on earlier drafts of this paper. Financial support for this paper was provided by Northwestern University in the form of a postdoctorate fellowship.

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