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Splitting Concepts

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2022

Gualtiero Piccinini  and
Sam Scott
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Abstract

A common presupposition in the concepts literature is that concepts constitute a singular natural kind. If, on the contrary, concepts split into more than one kind, this literature needs to be recast in terms of other kinds of mental representation. We offer two new arguments that concepts, in fact, divide into different kinds: (a) concepts split because different kinds of mental representation, processed independently, must be posited to explain different sets of relevant phenomena; (b) concepts split because different kinds of mental representation, processed independently, must be posited to explain responses to different kinds of category. Whether these arguments are sound remains an open empirical question, to be resolved by future empirical and theoretical work.

Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 73 , Issue 4 , October 2006 , pp. 390 - 409
Copyright
Copyright © The Philosophy of Science Association

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Footnotes

‡

The names of the authors are in alphabetical order. A version of this article was presented at the meeting of the Society for Philosophy and Psychology, in Winston-Salem, North Carolina, June 2005. Thanks to our commentator, Dan Ryder, and our audience, especially Ken Aizawa and Carl Gillett. Thanks also to Carl Craver, John Heil, Edouard Machery, Dan Weiskopf, and the referees for very helpful comments.

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