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Standards for Modest Bayesian Credences

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2022

Jessi Cisewski ,
Joseph B. Kadane ,
Mark J. Schervish ,
Teddy Seidenfeld  and
Rafael Stern
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Abstract

Gordon Belot argues that Bayesian theory is epistemologically immodest. In response, we show that the topological conditions that underpin his criticisms of asymptotic Bayesian conditioning are self-defeating. They require extreme a priori credences regarding, for example, the limiting behavior of observed relative frequencies. We offer a different explication of Bayesian modesty using a goal of consensus: rival scientific opinions should be responsive to new facts as a way to resolve their disputes. Also we address Adam Elga’s rebuttal to Belot’s analysis, which focuses attention on the role that the assumption of countable additivity plays in Belot’s criticisms.

Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 85 , Issue 1 , January 2018 , pp. 53 - 78
Copyright
Copyright © The Philosophy of Science Association

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