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A Successor to the Realism/Antirealism Question

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 April 2022

Janet A. Kourany
Janet A. Kourany*
Affiliation:
University of Notre Dame
*
†Send requests for reprints to the author, Department of Philosophy, 336 O'Shaughnessy Hall, University of Notre Dame, Notre Dame, Indiana 46556–5639.
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Abstract

The realism/antirealism controversy has gone on for centuries, and gives every indication that it will continue to go on for centuries. Dismayed, I take a closer look at it. I find that the question it poses—very roughly, whether scientific knowledge is true (approximately true, put forward as true, etc.) or only useful (empirically adequate, a convenient method of representation, etc.)—actually suppresses socially critical thought and discussion about science (e.g., concerning whether scientific knowledge is sexist or racist or socially harmful in other ways, or whether scientific knowledge is useful for achieving the goals we have or the goals we ought to have). I find, as well, that two of the most important responses to the realism/antirealism controversy—that which construes it as concerned with science's aims and that which construes it as concerned with science's results—fail to make sufficient empirical or normative contact with science. As a consequence, they provide representations of science that either do not help scientists (or nonscientists) make informed decisions about science, or actually hinder these individuals from doing so. I conclude that we should either stop engaging in the realism/antirealism controversy entirely, or else engage in it in a more socially responsible way—by gathering the right kinds of empirical and normative data, and framing more helpful versions of the questions we want to ask. I end by responding to the strong objections sure to be voiced by my colleagues in philosophy of science.

Type
Metaphilosophy and the History of the Philosophy of Science
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 67 , Issue S3: Supplement. Proceedings of the 1998 Biennial Meetings of the Philosophy of Science Association. Part II: Symposia Papers Sep., 2000 , 2000 , pp. S87 - S101
Copyright
Copyright © 2000 by the Philosophy of Science Association

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Footnotes

‡

I would like to thank my colleagues Don Howard and Phil Quinn for very helpful comments on an earlier version of this paper, and Beth Eldon of the Notre Dame Biology Department for stimulating discussions relevant to the topics of this paper.

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