Hostname: page-component-cd9895bd7-q99xh Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-12-26T04:57:39.810Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

Supervenient Bridge Laws

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 April 2022

Terence E. Horgan
Terence E. Horgan*
Affiliation:
DePauw University
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

I invoke the conceptual machinery of contemporary possible-world semantics to provide an account of the metaphysical status of “bridge laws” in intertheoretic reductions. I argue that although bridge laws are not definitions, and although they do not necessarily reflect attribute-identities, they are supervenient. I.e., they are true in all possible worlds in which the reducing theory is true.

Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 45 , Issue 2 , June 1978 , pp. 227 - 249
Copyright
Copyright © Philosophy of Science Association 1978

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Footnotes

†

I am grateful to Robert Causey, Alvin Goldman, Jaegwon Kim, Lawrence Sklar, and the referees of this journal for helpful comments on various ancestors of this paper.

References

[1] Ager, T., Aronson, J., and Weingard, R. “Are Bridge Laws Really Necessary?” Nous 8 (1974): 119–134.10.2307/2214781CrossRefGoogle Scholar
[2] Causey, R. “Attribute-identities in Microreductions.” Journal of Philosophy 69 (1972): 407–422.10.2307/2024853CrossRefGoogle Scholar
[3] Causey, R. “Uniform Microreductions.” Synthese 25 (1972): 176–217.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
[4] Enc, B. “Identity Statements and Microreductions.” Journal of Philosophy 73 (1976): 285–306.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
[5] Hare, R. The Language of Morals. New York: Oxford, 1964.Google Scholar
[6] Hempel, C. “On the ‘Standard Conception’ of Scientific Theories.” In Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Volume IV. Edited by Radner, M. and Winokur, S. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1970. pp. 142–163.Google Scholar
[7] Hempel, C. Philosophy of Natural Science. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1966. Chapter 8.Google Scholar
[8] Hempel, C. “Reduction: Ontological and Linguistic Facets.” In Philosophy, Science, and Method. Edited by Morgenbesser, S., Suppes, P., and White, M. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1969. pp. 179–199.Google Scholar
[9] Horgan, T. “The Case against Events.” Philosophical Review 87(1978): 28–47.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
[10] Kripke, S. “Identity and Necessity.” In Identity and Individuation. Edited by Munitz, M. New York: NYU Press, 1971. pp. 135–164.Google Scholar
[11] Kripke, S. “Naming and Necessity.” In Semantics of Natural Languages. Edited by Davidson, D. and Harman, G. Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing Co., 1974. pp. 253–355.Google Scholar
[12] Lewis, D. “How to Define Theoretical Terms.” Journal of Philosophy 67 (1970): 427–446.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
[13] Lewis, D. “Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications.” The Australasian Journal of Philosophy 10(1972): 249–258.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
[14] Moore, G. “The Conception of Intrinsic Value.” In Moore's Philosophical Studies. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1960. pp. 253–275.Google Scholar
[15] Nagel, E. The Structure of Science. New York: Harcourt, Brace, and World, 1961. Chapter 11.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
[16] Putnam, H. “On Properties.” In Essays in Honor of Carl G. Hempel. Edited by Rescher, N. Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing Co., 1969. pp. 235–254.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
[17] Putnam, H. “What Theories Are Not.” In Logic, Methodology, and Philosophy of Science. Edited by Nagel, E., Suppes, P., and Tarski, A. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1962. pp. 240–251.Google Scholar
[18] Quine, W. Methods of Logic. (2nd ed.). New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1959.Google Scholar
[19] Schaffner, K. “Approaches to Reduction.” Philosophy of Science 34 (1967): 137–147.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
[20] Sklar, L. “Types of Inter-Theoretic Reduction.” British Journal of the Philosophy of Science 18 (1967): 109–124.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
[21] Suppes, P. Introduction to Logic. New York: D. Van Nostrand, 1957.Google Scholar