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Talking to Neighbors: The Evolution of Regional Meaning

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2022

Kevin J. S. Zollman
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Abstract

In seeking to explain the evolution of social cooperation, many scholars are using increasingly complex game-theoretic models. These complexities often model readily observable features of human and animal populations. In the case of previous games analyzed in the literature, these modifications have had radical effects on the stability and efficiency properties of the models. We will analyze the effect of adding spatial structure to two communication games: the Lewis Sender-Receiver game and a modified Stag Hunt game. For the Stag Hunt, we find that the results depart strikingly from previous models. In all cases, the departures increase the explanatory value of the models for social phenomena.

Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 72 , Issue 1 , January 2005 , pp. 69 - 85
Copyright
Copyright © The Philosophy of Science Association

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Footnotes

‡

My gratitude is owed to Brian Skyrms, Jason McKenzie Alexander, Sam Hillier, the anonymous referees, and the participants in the Dynamics Seminar at UCI for their assistance. Generous financial support was provided by the School of Social Sciences and the Institute for Mathematical Behavioral Sciences at UCI.

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