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Tensor Products and Split-Level Architecture: Foundational Issues in The Classicism-Connectionism Debate

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 April 2022

Marcello Guarini
Marcello Guarini*
Affiliation:
University of Western Ontario
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Abstract

This paper responds to criticisms levelled by Fodor, Pylyshyn, and McLaughlin against connectionism. Specifically, I will rebut the charge that connectionists cannot account for representational systematicity without implementing a classical architecture. This will be accomplished by drawing on Paul Smolensky's Tensor Product model of representation and on his insights about split-level architectures.

Type
Philosophical Issues in Cognitive Science
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 63 , Issue S3: Supplement. Proceedings of the 1996 Biennial Meetings of the Philosophy of Science Association. Part I: Contributed Papers Sep., 1996. , 1996 , pp. S239 - S247
Copyright
Copyright © Philosophy of Science Association 1996

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Footnotes

†

I thank Ausonio Marras for comments on an earlier draft of this paper, and the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada for financial support, award 752–94–1127.

‡

Department of Philosophy, University of Western Ontario, London, Ontario, N6A 3K7.

References

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