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Two Theorems on Invariance and Causality

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2022

Nancy Cartwright
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Abstract

In much recent work, invariance under intervention has become a hallmark of the correctness of a causal-law claim. Despite its importance this thesis generally is either simply assumed or is supported by very general arguments with heavy reliance on examples, and crucial notions involved are characterized only loosely. Yet for both philosophical analysis and practicing science, it is important to get clear about whether invariance under intervention is or is not necessary or sufficient for which kinds of causal claims. Furthermore, we need to know what counts as an intervention and what invariance is. In this paper I offer explicit definitions of two different kinds for the notions intervention, invariance, and causal correctness. Then, given some natural and relatively uncontroversial assumptions, I prove two distinct sets of theorems showing that invariance is indeed a mark of causality when the concepts are appropriately interpreted.

Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 70 , Issue 1 , January 2003 , pp. 203 - 224
Copyright
Copyright © The Philosophy of Science Association

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Footnotes

‡

Thanks to Daniel Hausman and James Woodward for setting me off on this project and two referees for helpful suggestions. This research was funded by a grant from the Latsis Foundation, for which I am grateful, and it was conducted in conjunction with the Measurement in Physics and Economics Project at LSE. I wish to thank the members of that group for their help, especially Sang Wook Yi and Roman Frigg.

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