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Value Science

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 March 2022

D. W. Gotshalk
D. W. Gotshalk*
Affiliation:
University of Illinois
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Extract

It has frequently been argued that there is a clear and irreducible difference between statements of fact and statements of value. To say “X is cobalt” and “X is good” is to make statements differing not merely in detail but in kind. To attempt to reduce the second type of statement to the first is to commit the “naturalistic” fallacy. To attempt to reduce the first type of statement to the second is to commit the “idealistic” fallacy. In this paper, I shall accept this position as correct but argue that, far from settling the question of value science, it is merely the elementary premise from which all discussion of this matter must begin.

Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 19 , Issue 3 , July 1952 , pp. 183 - 192
Copyright
Copyright © 1952, The Williams & Wilkins Company

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References

1 The first eight chapters of my Art and The Social Order (University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1947, 1951) illustrate an effort to define the distinctive purpose of fine art as a human activity.