Hostname: page-component-78c5997874-mlc7c Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-11-10T12:47:50.307Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

Verisimilitude or the Approach to the Whole Truth

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 April 2022

Herbert Keuth
Herbert Keuth*
Affiliation:
University of Mannheim
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

Science progresses if we succeed in rendering the objects of scientific inquiry more comprehensively or more precisely. Popper tries to formalize this venerable idea. According to him the most comprehensive and most precise description of the world is given by the set T of all true statements. A hypothesis comes the closer to T, or has the more verisimilitude, the more true consequences and the fewer false consequences it implies. Popper proposes to order hypotheses by the inclusion relations between the sets of their true and of their false consequences (“truth contents” and “falsity contents”). A partial ordering would permit one to decide whether the substitution of theory t1 by t2 represents scientific progress. But because of the logical relations between the elements of the sets of logical consequences, or contents, false hypotheses cannot be compared. As our theories usually turn out to be false sooner or later, they can seldom be compared as to their verisimilitude and when they can, the result depends only on which theory implies the other and on their truth-values. Popper even tries to define a measure of verisimilitude on the partial ordering. It has to fail for the same reason. In addition he tries to relativize the concept of a content and fails. What is more, any attempt at defining a measure of better or worse correspondence to the whole truth must fail, as there is no justification for saying that any true primitive sentence asserts as much about reality as some other primitive sentence, or more.

Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 43 , Issue 3 , September 1976 , pp. 311 - 336
Copyright
Copyright © 1976 by the Philosophy of Science Association

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

REFERENCES

Bar-Hillel, Y. “Popper's Theory of Corroboration.” In The Philosophy of Karl Popper. Edited by Schilpp, P. A. LaSalle, II.: Open Court. 1974, Pages 332–348.Google Scholar
Harris, J. H. “Popper's Definitions of Verisimilitude.” The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 25 (1974): 160–166.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Lakatos, I. “Popper on Demarcation and Induction.” In The Philosophy of Karl Popper. Edited by Schilpp, P. A. LaSalle, II: Open Court, 1974. Pages 241–273.Google Scholar
Mazurkiewicz, S. “Über die Grundlagen der Wahrscheinlichkeitsrechnung I.” Monatshefte für Mathematik und Physik 41 (1934): 342–352.Google Scholar
Miller, D. “Popper's Qualitative Theory of Verisimilitude.” The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 25 (1974): 166–177.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Miller, D. “On the Comparison of False Theories by their Bases.” The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 25 (1974): 178–188.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Popper, K. R. “Philosophical Comments on Tarski's Theory of Truth” In his Objective Knowledge. An Evolutionary Approach. London: Oxford University Press, 1972. Pages 319–340.Google Scholar
Popper, K. R. “Truth Rationality, and the Growth of Scientific Knowledge.” In his Conjectures and Refutations. The Growth of Scientific Knowledge. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1963. Pages 215–250.Google Scholar
Popper, K. R. “Addenda 3.” In his Conjectures and Refutations. The Growth of Scientific Knowledge. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1963. Pages 391–397.Google Scholar
Popper, K. R. “Two Faces of Common Sense: An Argument for Commonsense Realism and Against the Commonsense Theory of Knowledge.” In Objective Knowledge. An Evolutionary Approach. London: Oxford University Press, 1972. Pages 32–105.Google Scholar
Popper, K. R. “The Formal Theory of Probability.” In The Logic of Scientific Discovery. New York: Basic Books, 1959. Pages 326–358.Google Scholar
Suppes, P. and Zinnes, J. L. “Basic Measurement Theory.” Reprinted in: Contemporary Problems in Statistics. A Book of Readings for the Behavioral Sciences. Edited by B. Lieberman. London: Oxford University Press, 1971. Pages 39–74.Google Scholar
Tarski, A. “The Concept of Truth in Formalized Languages.” In his Logic, Semantics, Metamathematics. Trans. Woodger, J. H. London: Oxford University Press, 1956. Pages 152–278.Google Scholar
Tarski, A. “Foundations of the Calculus of Systems” In his Logic, Semantics, Metamathematics. Trans. Woodger, J. H. London: Oxford University Press, 1956. Pages 342–383.Google Scholar
Tarski, A. “Fundamental Concepts of the Methodology of the Deductive Sciences” In his Logic, Semantics, Metamathematics. Trans. Woodger, J. H. London: Oxford University Press, 1956. Pages 60–109.Google Scholar
Tarski, A. “The Semantic Conception of Truth and the Foundations of Semantics.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 4 (1943/44): 341–375.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Tarski, A. “On Some Fundamental Concepts of Metamathematics” In his Logic, Semantics, Metamathematics. Trans. Woodger, J. H. London: Oxford University Press. Pages 30–37.Google Scholar
Tichý, P. “On Popper's Definitions of Verisimilitude.” The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science. 25 (1974): 155–160.CrossRefGoogle Scholar