Article contents
Well-Ordered Science’s Basic Problem
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 01 January 2022
Abstract
Kitcher has proposed an ideal-theory account—well-ordered science (WOS)—of the collective good that science’s research agenda should promote. Against criticism regarding WOS’s action guidance, Kitcher has advised critics not to confuse substantive ideals and the ways to arrive at them, and he has defended WOS as a necessary and useful ideal for science policy. I provide a distinction between two types of ideal theories that helps clarifying WOS’s elusive nature. I use this distinction to argue that the action-guidance problem that WOS faces remains even under the aims/means distinction because the WOS’s failure is more basic than critics have suggested.
- Type
- Discussion
- Information
- Copyright
- Copyright © The Philosophy of Science Association
Footnotes
This is a descendent of the manuscript “Well-Ordered Science: Ideals and Procedures.” Earlier versions of this article were presented both at the 8th Annual Values in Medicine, Science, and Technology Conference (University of Texas at Dallas, 2018), and at the 26th Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association (Seattle, 2018). Thanks to Katharina Bernhard, Alison Jaggar, Andrew Schroeder, Jamie Shaw, Katie Steele, and an anonymous referee for helpful comments.
References
- 6
- Cited by