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Wesley Salmon's Process Theory of Causality and the Conserved Quantity Theory

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 April 2022

Phil Dowe
Phil Dowe*
Affiliation:
School of Philosophy, University of New South Wales
*
‡Send reprint requests to the author, School of Philosophy, University of N.S.W., Anzac Pde, Kensington 2033, N.S.W. Australia.
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Abstract

This paper examines Wesley Salmon's “process” theory of causality, arguing in particular that there are four areas of inadequacy. These are that the theory is circular, that it is too vague at a crucial point, that statistical forks do not serve their intended purpose, and that Salmon has not adequately demonstrated that the theory avoids Hume's strictures about “hidden powers”. A new theory is suggested, based on “conserved quantities”, which fulfills Salmon's broad objectives, and which avoids the problems discussed.

Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 59 , Issue 2 , June 1992 , pp. 195 - 216
Copyright
Copyright © Philosophy of Science Association 1992

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Footnotes

†

A version of this paper was read at the Research School of Social Science, Australian National University. I would like to thank Peter Menzies, Paul Humphreys, Robert McLaughlin and the editor of Philosophy of Science for many helpful suggestions, and also the Philosophy Department, Research School of Social Science, Australian National University for its hospitality while this paper was prepared.

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