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Why Philosophical Theories of Evidence Are (and Ought To Be) Ignored by Scientists

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 April 2022

Peter Achinstein
Peter Achinstein*
Affiliation:
Johns Hopkins University
*
†Send requests for reprints to the author, Department of Philosophy, 347 Gilman Hall, 3400 N. Charles St., Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, MD 21218–6848.
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Abstract

There are two reasons, I claim, scientists do and should ignore standard philosophical theories of objective evidence: (1) Such theories propose concepts that are far too weak to give scientists what they want from evidence, viz., a good reason to believe a hypothesis; and (2) They provide concepts that make the evidential relationship a priori, whereas typically establishing an evidential claim requires empirical investigation.

Information

Type
Experiment and Conceptual Change
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 67 , Issue S3: Supplement. Proceedings of the 1998 Biennial Meetings of the Philosophy of Science Association. Part II: Symposia Papers Sep., 2000 , 2000 , pp. S180 - S192
Copyright
Copyright © 2000 by the Philosophy of Science Association

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References

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