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The Impossibility of ‘Possible’ Worlds

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  04 April 2001

Jonathan Harrison
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Abstract

The gist of these objections to the possible world account of necessity is that, for it to be true, ‘possible’ would have to be a name for an attribute. But to say that something is possible is not to describe it, but to say that there could be such a thing. And possibilities are not classes of entities. Possible worlds have been described as ways, but a way of getting to London from Cambridge is not an entity, and that there is a way is entailed by facts such as that if you travel south along the M3, you will get there.

Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy , Volume 74 , Issue 1 , January 1999 , pp. 5 - 28
Copyright
© The Royal Institute of Philosophy 1999

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