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Locke And The Problem Of Personal Identity

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  25 February 2009

Antony Flew M.A.
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Extract

Locke's contribution to the discussion was fourfold: First, he saw the importance of the problem; Second, he realized that the puzzle cases, the “strange suppositions,” were relevant; Third, he maintained “same” had a different meaning when applied to “person” from its meaning in other contexts; and, Fourth, he offered his much criticized solution of the problem.

Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy , Volume 26 , Issue 96 , January 1951 , pp. 53 - 68
Copyright
Copyright © The Royal Institute of Philosophy 1951

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References

1 All references to Locke's writings throughout this paper are to A. C. Fraser's edition of the Essay Concerning Human Understanding.

page 54 note 1 For this and similar cases, often very reminiscent of Locke's “strange suppositions” see William James, Psychology, Vol. 1.

page 57 note 1 For an illuminating treatment of the wild goose chase after some one necessary and sufficient condition of responsibility see H. Hart, The ascription of responsibility and rights, P.A.S. 1948–9.

page 57 note 2 All references to Berkeley are to A. C. Fraser's edition of the Works.

page 57 note 3 All references to Reid are to A. D. Woozley's edition of the Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man.

page 60 note 1 For a stylised account of such a process see the story of the gardener theory in Mr. John Wisdom's Gods P.A.S. 1944–5. For actual cases consider the ether in physics or the animal spirits in biology.

page 61 note 1 See William James in Vol. XXIII, p. 118 of the Proceedings of the Society for Psychical Research.

page 61 note 2 I should like to say here how much I owe both here and everywhere to Professor Gilbert Ryle.

page 64 note 1 For a disscusion of this particular term, as used by contemporary philoso-phers, see my Selves in Mind, 1949. It is perhaps worth mentioning that by a slip of the pen I blamed philosophers since Hume for the use of this queer term. I should have extended my attack to philosophers since Locke.

page 66 note 1 See his contribution to the Symposium on Verification. P.A.S. Supple-mentary Vol. XIX. I owe a great deal to him.

page 67 note 1 For a study of how this unavoidable open texture of so many concepts affects the law, and of many related subjects, see Dr. Glanville Williams series of articles on Language and the Law in Law Quarterly Review, Vols. 61 and 62. I owe a lot to them.