Goethe's Phenomenological Method

Fritz Heinemann

doi:10.1017/S003181910003059X

Goethe's Phenomenological Method

Published online by Cambridge University Press: 25 February 2009

Fritz Heinemann

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Nothing makes the occupation with the great minds of the past more attractive than the fact that with the change in the whole situation of the present time, with the maturing of one’s own personality, they appear in a new light and present themselves in rejuvenated shape. I had a curious experience of this kind, when it occurred to me during the investigation of some phenomenological problems, that Goethe, though ignorant of the name, had employed a definitely phenomenological method. In occupying myself now with the revealing of this fact, it will be my leading principle to understand Goethe through himself, and I shall try not to adapt his meanings to my own theories.

Type: Articles
Information: Philosophy , Volume 9 , Issue 33 , January 1934 , pp. 67 - 81

DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/S003181910003059X [Opens in a new window]
Copyright: Copyright © The Royal Institute of Philosophy 1934

References

^{page 67 note 1} Rotten, Elisabeth, Goethes Urphänomen und die platonische Idee. Giessen. 1913.Google Scholar

^{page 67 note 2} Goethes naturwissenschaftliche Schriften, ed. by Steiner, , Vol. IV, Part 2, p. 376; referred to subsequently as St.Google Scholar

^{page 68 note 1} Op. cit., p. 357.

^{page 68 note 2} Op. cit., p. 358.

^{page 68 note 3} Op. cit., p. 359.

^{page 68 note 4} Works, Weimar, edition, Section II, Vol. 13, p. 441Google Scholar, referred to subsequently as W. A. II.

^{page 68 note 5} In a letter dated January 12, 1798.

^{page 69 note 1} How near Goethe actually comes to Hegel’s historical conception may be gathered from an interesting remark to Schiller, in a letter of January 24, 1798 (Recl., Vol. II, p. 242).

^{page 69 note 2} W.A. II, Vol. II, p.98.

^{page 69 note 3} Letter to Schiller, referred to above.

^{page 69 note 4} W.A. II, Vol. 11, p. 78.

^{page 70 note 1} Letter, dated January 19, 1798.

^{page 70 note 2} St., Vol. IV, Part 2, p. 372.

^{page 70 note 3} W.A. II, Vol. II, p. 370.

^{page 70 note 4} Cf. Erfahrung und Wissenschaft. See Heynacher, : Goethe’s Philosophie aus scinen Werken, p. 159.Google Scholar

^{page 71 note 1} W.A. II, Vol. 11, p. 49.

^{page 71 note 2} Vorwort zur Farbenlehre, W.A. II, Vol. I, p. xii.

^{page 72 note 1} St., Vol. IV, Part 2, p. 376.

^{page 72 note 2} W.A. II, Vol. 13, p. 444.

^{page 72 note 3} Op. cit., p. 368.

^{page 72 note 4} Op. cit., p. 375.

^{page 72 note 5} Heynacher, p. 135.

^{page 73 note 1} Op. cit., p. 136.

^{page 73 note 2} W.A. II, Vol. II, pp. 43 and 28.

^{page 73 note 3} Op. cit.

^{page 73 note 4} Op. cit., pp. 48, 49.

^{page 73 note 5} W.A. II, Vol. 5, Part 2, p. 9.

^{page 74 note 1} W.A. II, Vol. 13, p. 444.

^{page 74 note 2} Op. cit., p. 454.

^{page 74 note 3} W.A. II, Vol. 13, p. 442.

^{page 75 note 1} W.A. II, Vol. 11, p. 40.

^{page 75 note 2} In this respect Goethe’s theory is a theory of pure intuition, not of pure reason (like Kant’s), or of pure knowledge (like Hermann Cohen’s).

^{page 75 note 3} Letter to Chr. v. Buddel.

^{page 75 note 4} Letter to S. Boisseree, February 25, 1832.

^{page 76 note 1} W.A. II, Vol. 5, Part 2, p. 21.

^{page 76 note 2} St., Vol. IV, Part 2, p. 349.

^{page 76 note 3} W.A. II, Vol. 12, p. 106.

^{page 76 note 4} Dated August 2, 1807.

^{page 78 note 1} Philostrats Gemdlde, 1818. W.A. I, Vol. 49, p. 142.Google Scholar

^{page 78 note 2} Letter to Chancellor von Müller, November 21, 1821

^{page 78 note 3} Letter to Riemer, November 21, 1805.

^{page 79 note 1} To Eckermann, February 13, 1829.

^{page 79 note 2} “Appearances are not independent of the observer; they are all interwoven and entangled in his individuality” (Maximen und Reflexionen, 1224, published by Hecker).Google Scholar

^{page 79 note 3} “To grasp the phenomena, to fix them to experiments, to arrange the experiences and know the possible modes of representation of them—the first as attentively, the second as accurately, the third as exhaustively as possible, and the last with sufficient many-sidedness—demands a moulding of a man's poor Ego, a transformation so great that I never should have believed it possible” (Correspondence between Goethe and F. H. Jacobi, 1846, p. 198).

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