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A Prolegomenon to an Identity Theory of Truth

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  04 April 2001

Stewart Candlish
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Abstract

Most recent discussions of truth ignore the fact that a few philosophers, past and present, have flirted with and sometimes openly subscribed to an identity theory, according to which a proposition's being true consists in its identity with the reality it is supposedly about. This neglect is probably due to the theory's counter-intuitiveness: it faces obvious and fundamental objections. The aim of this paper is to consider these objections and decide if there is a version of the theory which can escape them, thereby becoming an at least initially plausible candidate for an account of truth. In this way the metaphysical price exacted by commitment to an identity theory can be assessed.

Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy , Volume 74 , Issue 2 , April 1999 , pp. 199 - 220
Copyright
© The Royal Institute of Philosophy 1999

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