Published online by Cambridge University Press: 25 February 2009
Hume Regards it as a mere “Verbal Dispute” whether or not various “natural abilities” should be regarded as moral virtues. In his Treatise he complains that “good sense and judgment”, “parts and understanding” are classed in all systems of ethics of the day with bodily endowments and ascribed no “merit or moral worth”. Yet if compared with the received virtues, they fell short in no material respect, both sets being “mental qualities” and each equally tending to procure “the love and esteem of mankind’.
1 An Inquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals, Appendix IV, Of some verbal disputes. Ed. Charles W. Hendel, Bobbs-Merrill, 1957.
2 A Treatise of Human Nature, Book III, Part III, Section IV, in Hume's Philosophical Works, Vol. II, p. 391. (Edinburgh, 1854).
3 Ibid., Vol. II, p. 393.
4 Ibid., p. 393.
5 An Inquiry, p. 129.
6 An Inquiry, pp. 138–39.
7 Works, Vol. II, pp. 400 f.
8 Ibid., p. 404.
9 Ibid., 148–63.
10 “Freewill as involving Determinism”, Philosophical Review, 1957.
11 Cf. P. 138 of An Inquiry, Appendix IV.
12 Works, Vol. II, p. 396.
13 R. S. Downie and Elizabeth Telfer, Respect for Persons, Allen and Unwin, 1969, Ch. 3.
14 An Inquiry, p. 135.