Published online by Cambridge University Press: 02 December 2020
That the title of the Esprit des Lois is an accurate description of the contents of the book has not been seriously questioned, nor has the form of its translation into English as the Spirit of (the) Laws. But the extensive use of esprit by Montesquieu in the book has attracted the attention of most of its critics from the eighteenth century on. In the Lettres persanes, an ironical reflection of the manners, morals, customs, and laws of eighteenth-century France, the use of esprit is taken for granted; merely to amuse and interest is, clearly, a legitimate objective in a work of this type. But in a treatise of universal jurisprudence the frequent introduction of esprit has naturally provoked much comment, and some criticism.
1 Of these criticisms the best known is, of course, Mme Du Deffand's famous epigram, “C'est de l'esprit sur les lois,” which Voltaire's enthusiastic endorsement (Œuvres complètes, éd. Moland [Paris: Garnier frères, 1877–85], xiv, 188; xx, 14; xxxvii, 176; xx, 487) did so much to popularize and perpetuate. Of the many answers to this belittling epigram, the most convincing perhaps is that of La Harpe: “Madame Dudeffant, qui n'y voyait que des saillies, dit que c'était de l'Esprit sur les lois, et Voltaire adopta le mot et le jugement. J'ai assez connu madame Dudeffant pour assurer que cette femme, qui avait de l'esprit naturel, et surtout de l'esprit de société, sans aucune instruction, n'était pas plus en état d'apprécier l'Esprit des Lois que capable de le lire: elle ne pouvait que le parcourir, pour en parler.” J. F. La Harpe, Lycée ou Cours de Littérature ancienne et moderne (Paris: Didot, 1827), xv, 58. Sainte-Beuve is more judicial: “Le mot de Madame Du Deffand: ‘Ce n'est pas l'Esprit des Lois, c'est de l'Esprit sur les lois’ est un mot qui pouvait être vrai dans la société particulière de Montesquieu, mais qui cessait de l'être au point de vue du public et du monde.” Causeries du Lundi, 3d ed. (1852), vii, 72.
2 However, the reasoned criticisms of a Brunetière, or perhaps of a Buffon, cannot be passed over in silence, even though it might be possible to account for such criticisms by a personal motive or bias on the part of the critic. Voltaire's comments on Montesquieu's esprit need not be considered in this paper; they are interesting as a study in polemics perhaps, but of much less value as criticism. Objectivity or even elementary fairness toward opponents, critics or rivals can scarcely be included in the long list of Voltaire's brilliant and varied gifts and qualities, though he was capable of élans of generous praise.
3 Montesquieu usually referred to the Considérations sur les causes de la grandeur des Romains et de leur décadence as Mes Romains, and to De l'Esprit des Lois as Les Lois. For purposes of convenience these books will be referred to in this paper as the Romains and the Lois respectively.
4 Op. cit., xix, 3–12. Elsewhere, in the Encyclopédie méthodique, Grammaire et Littérature, Diderot and d'Alembert, first editors (Paris: Panckoucke; Liège, Plomteux, 1782–1830), ii, 1. Voltaire contented himself with a much simpler, broader definition: “Ce que nous entendons communément en françois par Esprit, bel-esprit, trait d'esprit, etc signifie des pensées ingénieuses.”
5 Pensées et Fragments inédits, edited by the Baron de Montesquieu, 2 vols. (Bordeaux: Gounouilhou, 1899–1901), ii, 303.
6 Ibid., p. 128.
7 Ibid., p. 127.
8 Ibid., p. 126.
9 Ibid., p. 11.
10 Ibid., p. 14.
11 Ibid., p. 13.
12 Ibid., p. 13.
13 Ibid., i, xxi.
14 Ibid., ii, 13–14.
15 Œuvres complètes de Montesquieu, éd. Laboulaye (Paris: Garnier frères, 1875–79), vii, 129.
16 Ibid., p. 123.
17 Ibid., iii, 325.
18 Op. cit., xlii, 212.—The quotation reads: “Il est ridicule de faire le goguenard dans un livre de jurisprudence universelle.”
19 F. Brunetière, Etudes critiques sur l'histoire de la littérature française, 6th ed. (Paris: Hachette, 1911), iv, 249–251.
20 Buffon, Nadault de, Discours sur le style (Paris: Hachette, 1895), pp. 18–19.—Vian quotes from Buffon's Discours de Réception as follows: “... le grand nombre de divisions, loin de rendre un ouvrage plus solide, en détruit l'assemblage; le livre paraît plus clair aux yeux, mais le dessein de l'auteur paraît obscur.” Vian adds: “Et il écrivit en note qu'il avait visé l'esprit des Lois.” Louis Vian, Histoire de Montesquieu (Paris: Didier, 1879), p. 303.Google Scholar
21 Dedieu, J., Montesquieu et la tradition politique anglaise en France; les sources anglaises de l'Esprit des Lois (Paris: Gabalda, 1909), p. 331, note 1.Google Scholar
22 Ibid., p. 336, note 1.
23 Taine, H., Les Origines de la France contemporaine. Ire Partie; L'Ancien Régime, 27th ed. (Paris: Hachette, 1910), ii, 87.Google Scholar
24 Op. cit., iv, 359–360.—In the editions of the Lois published during Montesquieu's lifetime there were two parts, and the Invocation aux Muses, from which this passage quoted is an extract, was to appear at the beginning of the second part, before Book XX. At the suggestion of a professor of belles-lettres named Vernet, Montesquieu's selfappointed proof-reader, this Invocation was omitted, though the author was reluctant to consent to the omission. Ibid., p. 359. In a different context, and no doubt in a different mood, also, Montesquieu wrote, in the Lois, while making the point that an author should not exhaust a subject, but should leave something to the reader: “Il ne s'agit pas de faire lire, mais de faire penser.” Ibid., iv, 8.
25 Ibid., vii, 284.
26 Vian, op. cit., p. 320.—It should be remembered that the Romains was based almost entirely on Latin histories and chronicles of at least some recognized standing, while many of the citations in the Lois were taken from the narrations of travellers, some of whom seem to have been conteurs with remarkably fertile imaginations, or possibly practical jokers of really superior ingenuity. Montesquieu has been severely, and justly, criticized for accepting, or appearing to accept, as authentic the tales of such writers. Some of his most surprising traits d'esprit are comments upon such narrations.
27 Ibid., pp. 314–315.
28 Ibid., p. 321.—This definition of the word is of course much broader than the one generally accepted for it. Larousse gives: “Fanfaronnade, vanterie, comme on en prête aux Gascons.” Vian would seem to find some support for his interpretation in a line from Sainte-Beuve, who said that Montesquieu used a “pointe gasconne ou basque,” Port Royal, 3d ed. (Paris: Hachette, 1867), i, 274. Later in the same work he says: “... on a Montesquieu qui aiguise et brusque son trait,” ii, 56.
29 Op. cit., iv, 309. (Book xix, Ch. v.)
30 Ibid., iv, 149. (Book xiv, Ch. ii.)
31 Ibid., v, 114. (Book xxiii, Ch. xxix.)—There are two other passages which are almost as good; one (iii, 124. Book iii, Ch. iii) directed against raids on the public treasury by interested individuals, and by what we would call today pressure groups. The other (vi, 138. Book xiii, Ch. xviii) against peace-time borrowing for military purposes.
32 In American popular speech nearly all forms of vigorous, colorful criticism are lumped together under the term sarcasm. This of course is inaccurate, but serves as a satisfying anathema among a generation formed by the vocabulary and the philosophy of high-pressure salesmanship.
33 Montesquieu would seem to be in general accord with the spirit of these observations when he writes: “Il n'y a point de gens que j'aie plus méprisés que les petits beaux esprits et les grands qui sont sans probité.” Ibid., vii, 154.
34 Just as a good caricature, though it foreshortens and oversimplifies its subject, will give a more accurate picture of its hidden character than the most detailed photograph, so a really soundly thought-out epigram may bring out the inner essence of a book, an individual, or a situation more clearly and faithfully than a scholarly analysis. The epigram cannot aim to convey the whole truth; it has justified itself if it points out the essential truth. By this test also the epigram of Mme Du Deffand fails.
35 Ibid., iv, 326. (Book xix, Ch. xvi.)
36 This conclusion to the introductory chapter of the thirtieth book, on the relationship of the feudal laws of the Francs to the establishment of the French monarchy, is an example of how carefully Montesquieu planned out the Lois, which so many critics have described as “formless.” The best answer to this criticism is that supplied by Lanson in a study in which he brilliantly sustains the thesis of the influence of the Cartesian philosophy on Montesquieu, among others. Le Déterminisme historique et l'idéalisme social dans l'Esprit des Lois, in Etudes d'histoire littéraire (Paris: Champion, 1929), pp. 135–163.
37 The impression which the adversaries of Montesquieu tried to create, that the Lois is almost entirely made up of more or less successful attempts at esprit, is easily met by a fairly simple analysis, which shows that even under the broadest interpretation of the word esprit this element, upon all subjects combined, occupies only a little over three per cent of the text of the Lois.
38 Op. cit., vii, 154.