112 L. A. Wood, in his Form and Origin of Milton's Antitrinitarian Conception, thinks he has found the source of Milton's theory of the Trinity in the XXX Dialogi of Ochino. I wish to comment briefly on his work.
The most obvious fact is that Wood does not discuss the Trinitarian conception of Milton and Ochino at all, but only the conception of the Second Person; of course, the First and Third Persons are just as important in any discussion of this kind, in order to find the truth, as the other. In the next place, Wood does not discuss any fundamental conceptions, but the merest details and trifles, which we might find in almost any writer on the subject. And, finally, the details which he gives do, in my opinion, by no means express the similarity which he claims for them.
Wood makes a great deal of the fact that Milton and Ochino both wrote in favor of polygamy. One is tempted to think that Wood believed, because they both maintained the theory of polygamy, that Milton's Trinitarian conception must be traced to Ochino. But, as it happens, we have conclusive evidence which shows that there is no significance in this matter. In the Commonplace Book (p. 114)—about which Wood seems to have known nothing—there is an entry from Sir Walter Raleigh, belonging to the period before 1644, which shows that Milton was in favor of polygamy at this comparatively early date. And the following entry, undoubtedly made after that from Raleigh, is from Thuanus. This is a note from the historian to the effect that Sebastian Castellio had translated Ochino's book on polygamy. But beyond this Milton of course knew nothing about Ochino's views on marriage, at that time, although he himself already believed in polygamy. Wood's conclusion that Milton shows the influence of Ochino in his views concerning the marital relationship is certainly unfounded.
Now, as to the Dialogi themselves, and Milton's relation to them: we must remember that Ochino's treatment is a dialogue between persons of different views, and that we cannot tell what the belief of the author actually is. One of the speakers is orthodox and goes under the author's own name—Ochino thought he could shield his own heterodoxy in this way. The title of the dialogue in which we are interested is this: “Concerning the Holy Trinity: it is shown in the same that there exist three Divine Persons: Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, differing in themselves, but consubstantial and alike eternal.” (Benrath, London, 1876, p. 288). Now this, of course, is the perfectly orthodox point of view and that which the speaker called “Ochino” represents. If this were indeed proved, as the title asserts, the churches of Switzerland could not have objected to the dialogue, nor could Milton have derived heresy from it. But Ochino, it was charged, allowed his opponent “Spiritus” (the Spirit of Doubt) to argue better for the heretics than he did for the orthodox. The proposition contained in the title is that which “Ochino,” though somewhat weakly, defends throughout the work. So, if we are going to find anything from which Milton might have drawn his ideas, we must find it in the words of “Spiritus.”
Let us then examine those words in one or two passages at least. Christ is, says Spiritus, “God's Spirit generated by God, who by his voice called the world into being; then by assuming the form of man, he exercised His works as the Logos of God.” (Wood, p. 68). But this is by no means Milton's conception of the problem. Christ, before the incarnation, was not the Spirit, but the Word, the Logos, the Wisdom of God, as Milton clearly says: and after the incarnation was not the Logos, nor did he exercise his works as the Logos, but as a man. This is fundamental. Wood says: “Milton's own words indicate his belief that Christ was of the same essence as the Father.” (p. 64). But this is precisely the thing that the seventy-two pages of Chapter V. in The Christian Doctrine are written to deny. Milton goes deeply into the metaphysics of theology on this subject. I will quote just two passages to illustrate. “Now it is evident that those who have not the same will cannot have the same essence. It appears, however, from many passages, that the Father and the Son have not . . . . the same . . . . will.” (P. W., IV. 100). “The Word therefore is not of the same essence with God.” (Ib., 109). Further, Spiritus says: “He [Christ] was immeasurable, just as the other two persons.” (Wood, 72). But Milton says: “Christ, although exalted to a state of highest glory, exists nevertheless in one definite place, and has not, as some contend, the attribute of ubiquity.” (P. W., IV. 308).
On the basis of what Wood has given us, it would be easy to cite a dozen such discrepancies. And if the passages which Wood quotes are so divergent from Milton's beliefs, the rest of Ochino is probably even more so. Furthermore, Wood does not seem to have clearly understood the terms which he was discussing; for example, instead of hypostasis he says hypothesis, which, theologically, is meaningless. And he also makes the ludicrous blunder of confusing the philosopher Socrates with Socrates Scholasticus. Milton's ideas concerning the Trinity cannot be traced to Ochino.
