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Information credibility and responses to corruption: a replication and extension in Argentina

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  23 October 2018

Matthew S. Winters  and
Rebecca Weitz-Shapiro
Matthew S. Winters
Affiliation:
University of Illinois, Urbana, IL, USA
Rebecca Weitz-Shapiro*
Affiliation:
Brown University, Providence, RI, USA
*
*Corresponding author. Email: rbweitz@brown.edu
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Abstract

Existing research shows that survey respondents are sensitive to the source of information about political corruption and respond more strongly to information from more credible sources. This behavior occurs more frequently among the politically sophisticated. In a nation-wide survey in Argentina, we successfully replicate results originally found in a study in Brazil. In addition, we examine whether citizens process information about corruption differently depending on their partisan identities. At odds with our initial expectations, we find that copartisans, opposition partisans, and other/non-partisans distinguish between information sources in very similar ways. These results suggest that even though partisanship affects baseline assessments of political candidates, citizens of all types are sensitive to the credibility of information they receive about political corruption.

Type
Research Notes
Information
Political Science Research and Methods , Volume 8 , Issue 1 , January 2020 , pp. 169 - 177
Copyright
Copyright © The European Political Science Association 2018 

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Supplementary material: Link

Winters and Weitz-Shapiro Dataset

Dataset

https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/4BPRUI
Link
Supplementary material: PDF

Winters and Weitz-Shapiro supplementary material

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