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The polarization dynamics of electoral reforms

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  07 May 2020

Zachary Peskowitz Open the ORCID record for Zachary Peskowitz [Opens in a new window]  and
James Szewczyk
Zachary Peskowitz*
Affiliation:
Department of Political Science, Emory University, Atlanta, GA, USA
James Szewczyk
Affiliation:
Department of Political Science, Emory University, Atlanta, GA, USA
*
*Corresponding author. Email: zachary.f.peskowitz@emory.edu
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Abstract

Electoral reforms affect legislative outcomes by influencing incumbent legislators’ behavior, new entrants’ behavior, and the probability that incumbents are replaced with new entrants. Empirical work on electoral reforms and polarization has focused on new entrants’ behavior. We employ a simple decision theoretic framework with partial incumbent policy persistence and spatial voting to examine the three channels jointly. We show that a reform designed to encourage ideological moderation produces larger effects on polarization when the reform is implemented than when it is removed. The key insight is that implementing a moderation-inducing reform generates a set of challengers who are more likely to defeat incumbents while the incumbents are more likely to win reelection when the reform is removed. We then empirically examine how elections and legislative polarization respond to unlimited PAC contributions in state legislatures. Examining incumbents’ decisions to stand for reelection, the electoral performance of incumbents who do run, and partisan polarization, we find empirical support for our predictions.

Keywords

American politicselections and campaignslegislative politicsrepresentation and electoral systems
Type
Original Article
Information
Political Science Research and Methods , Volume 10 , Issue 1 , January 2022 , pp. 116 - 135
Copyright
Copyright © The European Political Science Association 2020

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https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/JFZF0Y
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