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Trade and redistribution: trade politics and the origins of progressive taxation

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 October 2019

Lucy Barnes Open the ORCID record for Lucy Barnes [Opens in a new window]
Lucy Barnes*
Affiliation:
School of Public Policy, University College London, London, UK
*
*Corresponding author. E-mail: l.barnes@ucl.ac.uk
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Abstract

What explains variation in tax progressivity before World War I? I argue that trade politics shaped the emergence of progressive taxation. If labor could provide a useful ally, trade policy coalitions meant compromise on redistributive demands: progressive taxes, especially where inequality was lower. In time-series cross-sectional analysis, I find that trade interest proximity between labor and elites was associated with more progressive taxation in ten European countries between 1870 and 1913 under conditions of low inequality. The coalition and compromise mechanism is evident in sub-national evidence from Britain. Where constituency interests favored free trade, Liberal–Labour electoral alliance was more likely in 1906, and the local MP was more likely to support the 1909 “People's Budget” for progressive taxation.

Keywords

Comparative politicsindustrialized countrieseconomic policypolitical economy
Type
Original Articles
Information
Political Science Research and Methods , Volume 8 , Issue 2 , April 2020 , pp. 197 - 214
Copyright
Copyright © The European Political Science Association 2019

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