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“Illegal Religious Activities” and Counter-Terrorism in China

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  16 June 2020

Chi Zhang Open the ORCID record for Chi Zhang [Opens in a new window]
Chi Zhang*
Affiliation:
Independent scholar
*
Address correspondence and reprint requests to: Chi Zhang, Room 401 Unit 1 Building 4, Wen Pai Garden,Bingzhou South Road 116, Taiyuan, China. E-mail: zhangchilindsay@gmail.com
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Abstract

The fight against terrorism prompts governments to differentiate between “good” religious practices and the “bad” ones. The simplistic dichotomy of “good” and “bad” Muslims has led to a cascade of criticism, but a fallacy underlying this dualism remains underexplored. This paper examines the “no true Scotsman” fallacy that is prevalent in the political discourse surrounding terrorism and religion. It argues that China's attempt to counteract the essentialist assumption about Uyghurs leads to a reinforced “good-versus-bad” dichotomous categorization of Muslims, reflected in the binary of “normal” and “illegal” in China's religious policy. This is a major contribution to the existing literature on politics and religion because, theoretically, this paper applies the “no true Scotsman” fallacy and “good” and “bad” Muslims dichotomy to explain the relationship between politics and religion; empirically, it provides a rich overview of the political nature of religious policy in China.

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Article
Information
Politics and Religion , Volume 14 , Issue 2 , June 2021 , pp. 269 - 293
Copyright
Copyright © Religion and Politics Section of the American Political Science Association 2020

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Footnotes

*

I owe my profound gratitude and sincere thanks to Dr. Catherine Johns, Dr. Tim Wilson, Professor Ian Taylor, Professor Peter Lehr, and Professor John Anderson for their insightful comments on my work and all the members at the Handa Centre for the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence for their warm reception. I sincerely appreciate valuable comments and suggestions by two anonymous reviewers and the editors.

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