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Pathogen Proliferation: Threats from the Former Soviet Bioweapons Complex

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  17 May 2016

Kathleen M. Vogel
Kathleen M. Vogel*
Affiliation:
Cornell University, USA

Abstract

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This article outlines the proliferation threats of pathogen collections from the former Soviet biological weapons (BW) program and the inherent difficulties in safeguarding sensitive biological materials. It describes new U.S. government efforts to improve security conditions of these collections through the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Program. Finally, the article analyzes these U.S. programs and offers additional policy recommendations to reduce the proliferation threat from these dangerous pathogens.

Type
Biological Weapons
Information
Politics and the Life Sciences , Volume 19 , Issue 1 , March 2000 , pp. 3 - 16
Copyright
Copyright © Association for Politics and the Life Sciences 

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