Hostname: page-component-78c5997874-v9fdk Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-11-10T16:22:25.044Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

Faith-Based Organizations and Sustainable Sheltering Operations in Mississippi after Hurricane Katrina: Implications for Informal Network Utilization

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  28 June 2012

Anjali T. Pant*
Affiliation:
Johns Hopkins Department of Emergency Medicine, Baltimore, Maryland USA
Thomas D. Kirsch
Affiliation:
Johns Hopkins Department of Emergency Medicine, Baltimore, Maryland USA
Italo R. Subbarao
Affiliation:
Johns Hopkins Department of Emergency Medicine, Baltimore, Maryland USA
Yu-Hsiang Hsieh
Affiliation:
Johns Hopkins Department of Emergency Medicine, Baltimore, Maryland USA
Alexander Vu
Affiliation:
Johns Hopkins Department of Emergency Medicine, Baltimore, Maryland USA
*
Correspondence: Anjali T. Pant, MD, MPH New York Presbyterian Hospital/Weill Medical College of Cornell University Emergency Medicine 525 East 68th Street New York, NY 10021 E-mail: apant@jhsph.edu

Abstract

Introduction:

In the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, a significant number of faith-based organizations (FBOs) that were not a part of the formal National Response Plan (NRP) initiated and sustained sheltering operations.

Objective:

The objective of this study was to examine the sheltering opera-tions of FBOs, understand the decision-making process of FBO shelters, and identify the advantages and disadvantages of FBO shelters.

Methods:

Verbal interviews were conducted with FBO shelter leaders. Inclusion criteria were: (1) opening in response to the Katrina disaster; (2) oper-ating for more than three weeks; and (3) being a FBO. Enrolled shelters were examined using descriptive data methods.

Results:

The majority of shelters operating in Mississippi up to three weeks post-Katrina were FBO-managed. All of the operating FBO shelters in Mississippi that met the inclusion criteria were contacted with a response rate of 94%. Decisions were made by individuals or small groups in most shelters regarding opening, operating procedures, and closing. Most FBOs provided at least one enabling service to evacuees, and all utilized informal networks for sheltering operations. Only 25% of FBOs had disaster plans in place prior to Hurricane Katrina.

Conclusions:

Faith-based organization shelters played a significant role in the acute phase of the Katrina disaster. Formal disaster training should be ini-tiated for these organizations. Services provided by FBOs should be standard-ized. Informal networks should be incorporated into national disaster planning.

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © World Association for Disaster and Emergency Medicine 2008

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

1. Townsend, FF: The federal response to Hurricane Katrina: Lessons learned. Available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/reports/katrina-lessons-learned.pdf. Accessed 21 March 2007.Google Scholar
2. Rural Assistance Center: Faith-based organizations frequently asked questions. Available at http://www.raconline.org/info_guides/faith/faithfaq.php#faith. Accessed 01 May 2006.Google Scholar
3. The White House Office of Faith Based and Community Initiatives: Executive orders. Available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/government/fbci/executive-orders.html. Accessed 21 February 2006.Google Scholar
4. Committee on Education and the Workforce. http://www.house.gov/ed_work-force. Accessed 21 February 2006.Google Scholar
5. McGuire, G: , Gender, race, and informal networks: A study of network inclusion, exclusion, and resources. Available at http://www.iusb.edu/~sbres/randd/frgsample.PDF. Accessed 01 May 2006.Google Scholar
6. International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent: World Disasters Report 2005. Available at http://www.ifrc.org/publicat/wdr2005/intro.asp. Accessed 01 May 2006.Google Scholar
7. International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent: World Disasters Report 2004. Available at http://www.ifrc.org/publicat/wdr2004/chapter4.asp. Accessed 01 May 2006.Google Scholar
8. Neal, DM: The local Red Cross in time of disaster: Characteristics and condi-tions of organizational effectiveness during the Loma Prieta Earthquake and central Texas floods. Journal of Voluntary Administration 1992–93;11(2):616.Google Scholar
9. Kiefer, JJ, Montjoy, RS: Incrementalism before the storm: Network perfor-mance for the evacuation of New Orleans. Public Admn Rev 2006;(S):122130.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
10. Pavignani, E, Colombo, A: “Module 2: Making (rough) sense of (shaky) data. Available at http://www.who.int/hac/techguidance/tools/disrupted_sec-tors/module_02/en/index2.html. Accessed 02 May 2006.Google Scholar
11. Mattox, KL: Hurricanes Katrina and Rita: Role of individuals and collabora-tive networks in mobilizing/coordinating societal and professional resources for major disasters. Crit Care 2006;10:205–11.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
12. Brodie, M, Weltzien, E, Altman, D, et al. : Experiences of Hurricane Katrina evacuees in Houston shelters: Implications for future planning. Am J Public Health 2006;96(8):14021408.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed