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On Optimal and Equilibrium Retrial Rates in a Queueing System

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  27 July 2009

Refael Hassin  and
Moshe Haviv
Refael Hassin
Affiliation:
Department of Statistics and Operations ResearchTel Aviv University69978 Tel Aviv, Israel
Moshe Haviv
Affiliation:
Department of Econometrics, The University of Sydney, Sydney, New South Wales 2006, Australia and Department of Statistics, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, 91905 Jerusalem, Israel
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Abstract

We discuss socially optimal and equilibrium retrial rates in a single-server queueing model. We extend known results, compare the two rates, and suggest ways to impose tolls on retrials (or rebates for waiting) in order to equate the equilibrium rate with the socially optimal one.

Type
Research Article
Information
Probability in the Engineering and Informational Sciences , Volume 10 , Issue 2 , April 1996 , pp. 223 - 227
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 1996

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References

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