Published online by Cambridge University Press: 20 January 2017
1 Louis Henkin, How Nations Behave 47 (2d ed. 1979).
2 See, e.g., Raustiala, Kal, Compliance and Effectiveness in International Regulatory Cooperation, 32 Case W. Res. J. Int’l L. 387 (2000)Google Scholar; Martin, Lisa, Against Compliance, in Interdisciplinary Perspectives on International Law and International Relations: The State of the Art (Dunoff, Jeffrey L. & Pollack, Mark eds., 2013)Google Scholar.
3 See, e.g., Downs, George W., Rocke, David M. & Barsoom, Peter N., Is the Good News About Compliance Good News About Cooperation?, 50 Int’l Org. 379 (1996)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
4 Peter Spiro, Ukraine, International Law, and the Perfect Compliance Fallacy, Opinio Juris (Mar. 2, 2014), http://opiniojuris.org/2014/03/02/ukraine-international-law-perfect-compliance-fallacy/.
5 Meyer, Timothy, Power, Exit Costs, and Renegotiation in International Law, 51 Harv. Int’l L.J. 379 (2010)Google Scholar.
6 Hakimi, Monica, Unfriendly Unilateralism, 55 Harv. Int’l L.J. 105, 108 (2014)Google Scholar.
7 For a discussion of the distinction between negotiated and adjudicated lawmaking, see Cohen, Harlan Grant, International Law’s Erie Moment, 34 Mich. J. Int’l L. 249 (2013)Google Scholar.
8 Harold Hongju Koh, U.S. Dept. of State Legal Adviser, Opening Remarks at the United Nations’ Committee on the Rights of the Child Concerning the Optional Protocols to the Convention on the Rights of the Child (Jan. 16, 2013), https://www.aclu.org/human-rights/opening-remarks-legal-adviser-harold-hongju-koh-united-nations-committee-rights-child.
9 Beth A. Simmons, Mobilizing for Human Rights: International Law in Domestic Politics (2009).