Published online by Cambridge University Press: 25 November 2022
Incumbent politicians are understandably nervous when electoral rules are altered. In the case of the U.S. House of Representatives, members are well aware that a change in decade is accompanied by the near certainty that their own district lines will be redrawn. These incumbents know that changes resulting from the reallocation of congressional seats among states and the shift of population within states could have a shattering effect on their careers: their districts could be eliminated; they could be thrown into a district with another House incumbent; their district lines could be radically redrawn, destroying their traditional bases of support.
Incumbents' unease is transformed into serious worry by one additional fact: de jure control of redistricting is out of their hands. State legislatures and governors, the Justice Department (for those states falling under the Voting Rights Act) and ultimately the courts determine the fate of incumbents.
Of course, the ostensible purpose of congressional redistricting in accordance with the decennial census is to ensure that congressional representation reflects the changes in the geographical distribution of the nation's population and thus to ensure that the members of the House from each state represent approximately the same number of citizens. Putting that principle into practice creates opportunities for the parties to increase their strength in the House but it also causes tremendous uncertainty among incumbents.
Looking at political science research on the effects of redistricting on the fortunes of incumbents, one might wonder why they worry. In 1972 I reported findings of my study on incumbents who lost their elections after redistricting.
1 Bullock, Charles S. III, “Redistricting and Congressional Stability, 1962-72,” Journal of Politics, 37 (May 1975), 573 CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
2 Mayhew, David R., “Congressional Representation: Theory and Practice in Drawing the Districts,” in Reapportionment in the 1970s, ed. Polsby, Nelson W., pp. 249–290 Google Scholar; Tufte, Edward R., “The Relationship between Seats and Votes in Two-Party Systems,” American Political Science Review, 67 (June 1973), 551–554 CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
3 Tufte, p. 553.
4 See, for example, Ferejohn, John A., “On the Decline of Competition in Congressional Elections,” American Political Science Review, 71 (March 1977), 166–176 CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
5 Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, April 3, 1982, p. 763 Google Scholar.
6 This and the next paragraph utilizes information in Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, January 10, 1982, p. 73 Google Scholar.
7 Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, March 20, 1982, p. 613 Google Scholar.
8 Tufte, p. 554.
9 Figures for percent black for 1980 are taken from Barone, Michael and Ujifusa, Grant, Almanac of American Politics, 1982 (Washington, D.C.: Barone and Company, 1981)Google Scholar.
10 Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, April 24, 1982, p. 923 Google Scholar. Another analyst estimates a net Republican loss of three or four seats, Broder, David S., “How the GOP Blew Its Best House Shot,” Washington Post (June 27, 1982), C1 Google Scholar.
11 “Democrats Likely to Gain 6 Seats in House through Representation,” Atlanta Journal and Constitution, June 20, 1982, p. 26A Google Scholar.
12 Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, April 3, 1982, p. 752 Google Scholar.