Hostname: page-component-cd9895bd7-gvvz8 Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-12-28T00:41:21.253Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

Economic assessment of the Champagne wine qualitative stock mecanism

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  12 October 2006

Jacques Laye  and
Maximilien Laye
Jacques Laye
Affiliation:
L.E.F. UMR INRA-ESR/ENGREF, 14 rue Girardet, CS 4216, 54042 Nancy Cedex, France; laye@nancy-engref.inra.fr
Maximilien Laye
Affiliation:
Laboratoire d'Économétrie de l'École Polytechnique, 1 rue Descartes, 75005 Paris, France; maximilien.laye@shs.polytechnique.fr
Get access

Abstract

In the wine AOC system, the regulation of quantities performed by the professionalorganizations is aimed to smooth the variations of the quality of the wine due to thevariations in the climate that affect the quality of the grapes. Nevertheless, this regulationcould be damaging to the consumers due to the price increase resulting from the reduction ofthe quantities sold on the market. We propose a stochastic control model and a simulation toolable to measure the effects of this mechanism on the producer's profit and the consumer'ssurplus.

Keywords

Contrôle stochastiquestocks régulateurs.
Type
Research Article
Information
RAIRO - Operations Research , Volume 40 , Issue 2: ROADEF 03 , April 2006 , pp. 235 - 251
Copyright
© EDP Sciences, 2006

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

Edward, R. and Hallwood, C.P., The Determination of Optimum Buffer Stock Intervention Rules. Quart. J. Economics 94 (1980) 151–166. CrossRef
E. Giraud-Héraud, L.-G. Soler, S. Steinmetz and H. Tanguy, La régulation interprofessionnelle dans le secteur viti-vinicole est-elle fondée économiquement? bulletin de l'OIV 71 (1998) 813–814.
R.A. Howard, Dynamic Programming and Markov Processes. Jointly published by MIT Technology Press and Wiley (1960).
Massel, B., Price Stabilization and Welfare. Quart. J. Economics 83 (1961) 284–298. CrossRef
Mussa, M. and Rosen, S., Monopoly and product quality. J. Economic Theory 18 (1978) 301–317. CrossRef
D. Newbery and J.E. Stiglitz, The Theory of Commodity Price Stabilization. Oxford University Press (1981).
The De, W. Oisirability of Price Instability Under Perfect Competition. Econometrica 29 (1961) 58–64.
Turnovsky, S.J., Price Expectations and the Welfare Gains from Price Stabilization. Amer. J. Agricultural Economics 56 (1974) 706–716. CrossRef
Turnovsky, S.J., The Distribution of Welfare gains from Price Stabilization: the case of Multiplicative Disturbances. Inter. Economic Rev. 17 (1976) 133–148. CrossRef
Waugh, F.V., Does the Consumer Benefit from price Instability? Quart. J. Economics 53 (1944) 602–614. CrossRef
J.C. Williams and B.D. Wright, Storage and Commodity Markets. Cambridge University Press (1991).
Wright, B.D. and Williams, J.C., The Economic Role of Commodity Storage. Economic J. 92 (1982) 596–614. CrossRef
Wright, B.D. and Williams, J.C., The Roles of Public and Private Storage in Managing Oil Import Disruptions. Bell J. Economics 13 (1982) 341–353. CrossRef
Wright, B.D. and Williams, J.C., The Welfare Effects of the Introduction of Storage. Quart. J. Economics 99 (1984) 169–192. CrossRef
Wright, B.D. and Williams, J.C., The Incidence of Market-Stabilizing Price Support Schemes. Economic J. 98 (1988) 1183–1198. CrossRef