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Cible d'inflation ou de niveau de prix: quelle option retenir pour la banque centrale dans un environnement « Nouveau Keynésien » ?*

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  17 August 2016

Ludovic Aubert  and
Stephane Adjemian
Ludovic Aubert
Affiliation:
Direction de la Prévision, Ministère de I'Économie, des Finances et de I'Industrie
Stephane Adjemian
Affiliation:
EPEE, Département d'Économie, Université d'Évry-Val-d'Essonne
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Résumé

Dans la lignée de Svensson (1999) cet article se propose de reconsidérer la question du choix de la cible pour la banque centrale, selon les deux alternatives cible d'inflation ou cible de niveau de prix, sous une courbe de Phillips de type nouveau keynésien. Nos résultats tendent à plaider en faveur de l'adoption par la banque centrale d'une cible de niveau de prix. La comparaison des politiques discrétionnaires, sous les deux type de régimes, à la règle optimale sous engagement définie par Clarida, Gali et Gertler (2000) montre que la préférence pour la cible de niveau de prix s'explique par une meilleure gestion du problème de la crédibilité de la politique monétaire.

Summary

Summary

Following Svensson (1999), this article examines the central bank's choice between two alternatives, an inflation targeting or a price-level targeting strategy, under a new keynesian Phillips curve. Our results tend to favour the adoption of a price-level targeting strategy by the central bank. By comparing discretionary policies under the two targets, and the optimal rule under commitment (as defined by Clarida, Gertler and Gali (2000)), we show the price-level targeting strategy is preferable as it allows for a better management of the credibility problem of the monetary policy.

Keywords

politique monétairecible de niveau de prixcible d'inflationcrédibilitéE52E58Monetary policyprice-level targetinginflation targetingcredibilityE52E58
Type
Research Article
Information
Recherches Économiques de Louvain/ Louvain Economic Review , Volume 69 , Issue 3 , 2003 , pp. 293 - 317
Copyright
Copyright © Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de recherches économiques et sociales 2003 

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Footnotes

**

Direction de la Prévision, Ministère de I'Économie, des Finances et de I'Industrie, télédoc 677 -139, rue de Bercy 75572 Paris cedex 12. Tél: 01 53 18 85 81. E-mail: ludovic.aubert@dp.finances.gouv.fr. Au moment de la rédaction de I'article, I'auteur etait rattaché au laboratoire EPEE, Université d'Évry-Val-d'Essonne.

***

EPEE, Département d'Économie, Université d'Évry-Val-d'Essonne, 4 Bid. François Mitterrand 91025 Evry. E-mail: stephane.adjemian@eco.univ-evry.fr.

*

Nous remercions D. Eyssartier, M. Guillard et D. Laskar pour leurs commentaires et suggestions. Bien entendu, nous restons seuls responsables des eventuelles erreurs et insutfisances.

References

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