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Pouvoirs de marché et informations privées en équilibre général: la théorie peut-elle avoir un pouvoir prédictif?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  17 August 2016

Louis-André Gérard-Varet
Louis-André Gérard-Varet*
Affiliation:
GREQE, Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Societies, Marseille
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Résumé

La théorie de l’équilibre général walrasien possède un pouvoir prédictif, du moins tant que l’on veut bien s’en tenir à des environnements en information complète, en l’absence de pouvoirs de marché et où il est connaissance commune que les marchés doivent s’équilibrer. On examine ici les difficultés qui surviennent dès que sont pris en considération des pouvoirs de marché ou des informations privées.

Summary

Summary

The Walrasian model of general equilibrium offers some predictive power, at least when the agents are completely informed about their environments, in the absence of market power and if it is common knowledge that the markets must clear. The present paper studies issues about how to integrate market powers or private informations.

Keywords

021026036021026036
Type
Research Article
Information
Recherches Économiques de Louvain/ Louvain Economic Review , Volume 55 , Issue 4 , 1989 , pp. 313 - 338
Copyright
Copyright © Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de recherches économiques et sociales 1989 

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Footnotes

*

Le présent document reprend un exposé présenté aux «Journées d’Etudes sur la Notion d’Equilibre» tenues à Louvain-la-Neuve, les 9 et 10 mai 1989. Je remercie A. Leroux et P. Mongin pour leurs commentaires.

References

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