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À propos de la prétendue spécificité de l’approche classique

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  17 August 2016

Nicolas Gravel
Nicolas Gravel*
Affiliation:
THEMA Université de Cergy-Pontoise
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Résumé

Dans cet article, je met en cause l’allégation de Duménil et Lévy selon laquelle l’« approche classique » offrirait une alternative au cadre conceptuel d’Arrow-Debreu en théorie micro-économique. Plus spécifiquement, l’argumentation développée dans cet article est à l’effet que les deux propositions principales de l’approche classique — l’égalité des taux de profits d’équilibre et l’indépendance des prix d’équilibre par rapport aux demandes des ménages — sont, respectivement, une caractéristique indissociable de l’équilibre général du modèle Arrow-Debreu et un cas particulier de ce cadre conceptuel. En outre, je soutiens la thèse que les modèles de déséquilibres de Duménil et Lévy sont ad hoc et, pour cette raison, sont incapables de fournir des fondements micro-économiques à la modélisation du comportement hors-équilibre du système économique.

Summary

Summary

In this paper, I question Duménil and Levy’s claim that the so-called “classical approach” provide an alternative to the standard Arrow-Debreu framework in Microeconomic Theory. More specifically, it is argued that the two main propositions set forth by the “classical” approach — equality amongst equilibrium profit rates and independence of equilibrium prices from household’s demands — are, respectively, congenial to the Arrow-Debreu general equilibrium model and a (very) particular case of this framework. Moreover, I argue that Duménil and Levy’s disequilibrium models are ad hoc and, for this reason, can not serve as microeconomic foundations for the behaviour of the economic system out of equilibrium.

Keywords

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Type
Research Article
Information
Recherches Économiques de Louvain/ Louvain Economic Review , Volume 61 , Issue 3 , 1995 , pp. 301 - 328
Copyright
Copyright © Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de recherches économiques et sociales 1995 

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