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Ressources renouvelables et quotas d'exploitation dans un modèle à générations imbriquées

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  17 August 2016

Pierre-André Jouvet  and
Gilles Rotillon
Pierre-André Jouvet
Affiliation:
GREQAM, Marseille et GAINS, Université du Maine
Gilles Rotillon
Affiliation:
THEMA, Université Paris X-Nanterre
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Résumé

Dans le cadre d'un modèle à générations imbriquées, nous supposons que la gestion d'une ressource renouvelable correspond à l'émission de quotas d'exploitation transferables. Chaque agent a la possibilité d'utiliser les quotas dans la production ou de les vendre à la génération suivante. Nous montrons qu'une telle politique de gestion d'une ressource naturelle renouvelable est possible seulement pour certain niveaux de ressource au moment de l'introduction des quotas. Nous montrons alors que les quotas conduisent à l'existence d'un unique équilibre stable de long terme fonction du niveau d'exploitation défini par le planificateur.

Summary

Summary

We consider a transférable quotas market in order to manage a renewable resource in an overlapping generations framework. Each agent can use or not the quotas that he or she possesses in the production process. The use of the quotas in the production process leads to their destruction and also leads to reduce the stock of resource; the non-use of the quotas allows their owner to resell them in the second time period on the financial market. We show that the resource management with a market of quotas is possible only for some initial resource level. In this case, quotas allows to a unique steady state equilibrium for any choice of quotas allocation.

Keywords

quotasrenewable resourcesoverlapping generationsD92H23Q20quotas d'exploitationressources renouvelablesgénérations imbriquéesD92H23Q20
Type
Research Article
Information
Recherches Économiques de Louvain/ Louvain Economic Review , Volume 71 , Issue 1 , 2005 , pp. 117 - 130
Copyright
Copyright © Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de recherches économiques et sociales 2005 

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Footnotes

(*)

Les auteurs remercient les participants au colloque en I’honneur de Philippe Michel, les 8 et 9 Novembre, 2002 et notamment Pierre Pestieau pour ses commentaires éclairés. Nous remercions également deux rapporteurs anonymes de la revue.

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