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Salaire minimum, allocations chômage et efficacité du marché du travail

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  17 August 2016

Frédéric Gavrel  and
Isabelle Lebon
Frédéric Gavrel
Affiliation:
CERENE, Université du Havre, Faculté des Affaires Internationales, 25 rue Philippe Lebon, BP 420, 76057 Le Havre Cedex, France, frederic.gavrel@univ-lehavre.fr, isabelle.lebon@univ-lehavre.fr.
Isabelle Lebon
Affiliation:
CERENE, Université du Havre, Faculté des Affaires Internationales, 25 rue Philippe Lebon, BP 420, 76057 Le Havre Cedex, France, frederic.gavrel@univ-lehavre.fr, isabelle.lebon@univ-lehavre.fr.
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Résumé

En utilisant un modèle d'appariement avec différenciation des qualifications, nous étudions l'effet du salaire minimum sur le fonctionnement du marché du travail. L'introduction d'un salaire minimum semble améliorer l'adéquation des travailleurs aux emplois en rendant les “mauvaises” associations impossibles. Trois résultats principaux sont ainsi établis. Premièrement, le salaire minimum peut augmenter l'efficacité du marché du travail. Ensuite, dès que le salaire minimum est suffisamment élevé pour contraindre effectivement la formation des salaires, les allocations chômage perdent tout effet positif sur la productivité et deviennent invariablement inefficientes (en excluant les situations de sur-emploi). Finalement, des simulations numériques montrent que l'introduction d'un salaire minimum peut être un meilleur instrument de régulation du marché du travail que l'augmentation des allocations chômage.

Summary

Summary

Using a simple matching model with differentiated skills, we study the effect of a minimum wage on mismatch. Introducing a minimum wage appears to improve the assignment of jobs to workers by making “bad” matches impossible. Three main results are established. First, a minimum wage increase may improve the efficiency of the labour market. Next, as soon as the minimum wage is binding (some workers do earn this minimum), unemployment benefits loose their effect on productivity, becoming invariably inefficient then. In the end, numerical simulations show that introducing a minimum wage might be more efficient than increasing unemployment benefits.

Keywords

J64J65salaire minimumallocations chômageproductivitéappariementemploidifférenciation des qualificationsJ64J65minimum wageunemployment benefitsproductivitymatchingemploymentdifferentiation of skills
Type
Research Article
Information
Recherches Économiques de Louvain/ Louvain Economic Review , Volume 74 , Issue 1 , 2008 , pp. 53 - 75
Copyright
Copyright © Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de recherches économiques et sociales 2008 

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Footnotes

**

Les auteurs remercient Antoine d'Autume, Pieter Gautier, André Zylberberg et le rapporteur anonyme pour leurs remarques et suggestions, mais restent seuls responsables des éventuelles erreurs et insuffisances.

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