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Une analyse économique de la sécession

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  17 August 2016

Grégoire Rota Graziosi
Grégoire Rota Graziosi*
Affiliation:
Faculté de Droit et Sciences Economiques, Université de Franche-Comté, LIBRE**
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Résumé

Cet article propose une analyse économique de la sécession. Il s’inspire des travaux d’Alesina et Spolaore (1997), de Berkowitz (1997) et de Bolton et Roland (1997). Le raisonnement mené au niveau des Etats est largement transférable aux collectivités locales (régions, villes,…). Le recours à une représentation spatiale de la population nous permet d’appréhender l’hétérogénéité des préférences individuelles en matière de bien public. Le pays est supposé divisé en deux régions. La décision de sécession résulte d’un arbitrage individuel entre pression fiscale et localisation du bien public local, cet arbitrage évoluant selon la taille et le découpage régional du pays. En l’absence de disparités de revenus, nous montrons que le centre, la plus grande des deux régions, est davantage enclin à l’indépendance. Une approche normative, en terme de surplus, conclut notre analyse en appréciant l’efficacité économique du processus démocratique. Il apparaît alors que toute sécession unilatérale réduit le bien-être des deux régions.

Summary

Summary

The purpose of this article is to provide an economic analysis of secession. It can be viewed as an immediate successor of the works of Alesina and Spolaore (1997), Berkowitz (1997) and Bolton and Roland (1997). We use a spatial representation of the population to study the heterogeneity of individual’s preference in public goods. In a two-region country, the size has two antagonist effects on individual utility. On one hand, as the country grows, the individual fiscal pressure goes down. And on the other hand, more and more people feel frustrated by the production of public good in an unique place, the capital. Without revenu disparities, we show the center prefers the secession. A normative view ends this analysis. We conclude that unilateral secession reduces the two-region welfare.

Keywords

Public goodreferendumsecessionunionD2H2H7bien publicreferendumsécessionunionD2H2H7
Type
Research Article
Information
Recherches Économiques de Louvain/ Louvain Economic Review , Volume 67 , Issue 3 , 2001 , pp. 315 - 348
Copyright
Copyright © Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de recherches économiques et sociales 2001 

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Footnotes

*

Je tiens particulièrement à remercier Bertrand Crettez ainsi que les deux rapporteurs anonymes de la revue pour leurs précieux conseils sur les versions précédentes. Mes remerciements s’adressent également à Jean-Michel Courtault et à François Maréchal. Je reste seul responsable des erreurs ou omissions qui peuvent encore subsister.

**

Laboratoire Interdisciplinaire Bisontin de Recherches Économiques 45 D, Avenue de l’Observatoire, 25030 Besançon, rota@francemail.com

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