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Varieties of Governance

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  17 August 2016

Ciaran Driver
Ciaran Driver*
Affiliation:
Imperial College London
*
*Imperial College Business School, London SW7 2AZ. Email: c.driver@imperial.ac.uk. I am grateful to two referees and to Paul Temple and Grahame Thompson for helpful and perceptive comments.
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Summary

The reform of corporate governance is again on the agenda in the wake of Enron and excessive risk-taking by financial institutions. However, the search for new and better forms of governance often seems to lack guiding principles. A theory of corporate governance ought to emerge from a theory of the firm. Yet, the literature shows how this project is both difficult and far from complete. In this paper we review how existing theory provides a variety of arguments favouring either a shareholder or a stakeholder orientation. These arguments may depend on whether the prime objective for governance is improved current performance or a more long-term focus for firms. A brief review of recent US governance reforms is given as a backdrop to discussing more far-reaching proposals that have emerged in the recent literature; a greater role for institutional investors on the one hand or a return to managerial capitalism on the other.

Résumé

Résumé

La réforme du gouvernement d'entreprise est de nouveau d'actualité, suite aux répercussions d'Enron et aux prises de risques excessives de certaines institutions financières. Toutefois, il semble que la recherche de nouveaux modèles de gouvernement d'entreprise manque souvent de lignes directrices. Toute théorie de gouvernement d'entreprise devra émerger d'une théorie de l'entreprise. Pourtant, l'état de la littérature montre combien ce projet est à la fois difficile et loin d'être accompli. Dans cet article, nous passons en revue les différentes théories existantes. Nous tentons de voir comment ces théories fournissent une série d'arguments qui donnent la préférence soit à une orientation de type « partie prenante », soit une orientation « actionnariale ». Ces arguments varient selon que l'objectif premier de la firme est l'amélioration de la performance actuelle ou au contraire une vision long-terme de l'activité de la firme. Le bref aperçu des récentes réformes de gouvernement d'entreprise aux Etats-Unis constituera la toile de fond à une réflexion sur les propositions de large envergure qui ont émergé dans la littérature récente : un plus grand rôle attribué aux investisseurs institutionnels d'une part, et un retour à un capitalisme managérial d'autre part.

Keywords

Gouvernement d'entrepriseactionnairesparties prenantesinnovationG30G31M14D21L2L1corporategovernanceshareholderstakeholderinnovationG30G31M14D21L2L1
Type
Research Article
Information
Recherches Économiques de Louvain/ Louvain Economic Review , Volume 74 , Issue 4 , 2008 , pp. 425 - 453
Copyright
Copyright © Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de recherches économiques et sociales 2008 

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