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Are atheist worlds really the best?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  03 December 2020

KIRK LOUGHEED Open the ORCID record for KIRK LOUGHEED [Opens in a new window]
KIRK LOUGHEED*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, Humanities Building, University of Pretoria, Pretoria, South Africa
*
e-mail: philosophy@kirklougheed.com
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Abstract

Anti-theism is the view that God's existence would (or does) detract from the value of the world. A distinctive argument for anti-theism says that the very best atheist worlds are better than the best theist worlds. The reason for this is that it's possible to gain most or all of the benefits associated with theism in Godless worlds. For instance, worlds with a lesser god or several lesser gods can provide many of the benefits of theism without the associated disadvantages. While some work has been done to show that the advantages of theism can be had in atheist worlds, very little has been said regarding whether the disadvantages can simultaneously be avoided in such worlds. I aim to show that it is difficult to describe a possible atheist world where the benefits of theism obtain but the harms do not. I thus problematize this particular argument for anti-theism.

Type
Original Article
Information
Religious Studies , Volume 58 , Issue 2 , June 2022 , pp. 345 - 358
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Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2020. Published by Cambridge University Press

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